The Deontic Cycling Problem

William Simkulet

The Deontic Cycling Problem

William Simkulet

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In his recent article "Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality," Tim Willenken argues that commonsense ethics allows for rational agents having both ranked reasons (A > B, B > C, and A > C) and cyclical reasons (A < B, B < C, and A > C). His goal is to show that not all plausible views are variations of consequentialism, as consequentialism requires ranked reasons. I argue instances of apparent deontic cycling in commonsense morality are the byproducts of incomplete characterizations of the cases in question.

Original language	American English
Journal	Philosophical Analysis
Volume	31
State	Published - Jan 1 2014

Keywords

common sense
commonsense ethics
ethics
trolley case
morality
consequentialism
deontic cycling

Disciplines

Philosophy

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The Deontic Cycling ProblemFinal published version, 618 KBLicense: CC BY

Cite this

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AB - In his recent article "Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality," Tim Willenken argues that commonsense ethics allows for rational agents having both ranked reasons (A > B, B > C, and A > C) and cyclical reasons (A < B, B < C, and A > C). His goal is to show that not all plausible views are variations of consequentialism, as consequentialism requires ranked reasons. I argue instances of apparent deontic cycling in commonsense morality are the byproducts of incomplete characterizations of the cases in question.

KW - common sense

KW - commonsense ethics

KW - ethics

KW - trolley case

KW - morality

KW - consequentialism

KW - deontic cycling

UR - https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clphil_facpub/20

M3 - Article

VL - 31

JO - Philosophical Analysis

JF - Philosophical Analysis

ER -

The Deontic Cycling Problem

Abstract

Keywords

Disciplines

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