Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally-Funded Research

Michael Henry Davis, Peter S. Arno

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    This Article discusses drug pricing in the context of federally funded inventions. It examines the “march-in” provision of the Bayh-Dole Act, a federal statute that governs inventions supported in whole or in part by federal funding. It discusses technology-transfer activity as a whole and the often-conflicting roles of the government, academia, and industry. The Article discusses the mechanisms of the Bayh-Dole Act and examines its legislative history. It notes that the Act has had a powerful price-control clause since its enactment in 1980 that mandates that inventions resulting from federally funded research must be sold at reasonable prices. The Article concludes that the solution to high drug prices does not involve new legislation but already exists in the unused, unenforced march-in provision of the Bayh-Dole Act.

    Original languageAmerican English
    JournalTulane Law Review
    Volume75
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2001

    Keywords

    • Bayh-Dole Act
    • drug pricing
    • technology-transfer

    Disciplines

    • Food and Drug Law

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